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most Americans the nexus of the political order to the divine reality. According to Robert Bellah, who 
stimulated much of the discussion about civil religion with his seminal essay in 1967, civil religion in 
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Law & The Sacred: Competing Notions of Law in American Civil Religion 
 
Derek H. Davis 
 
 
  
The presence of a civil religion in America is now widely accepted. While its specific content is still 
debated, most agree that civil religion is essentially about those public rituals and myths that express for 
most Americans the nexus of the political order to the divine reality. According to Robert Bellah, who 
stimulated much of the discussion about civil religion with his seminal essay in 1967, civil religion in 
America is "an understanding of the American experience in the light of ultimate and universal reality" 
(18). 
 
Much of the literature of recent decades exploring civil religion has centered on the definitional problem. 
By 1974, there were so many characterizations of civil religion that Russell Richey and Donald Jones 
were prompted to offer a useful five-category schema for the organization of civil religion literature. 
These categories were folk religion, transcendent religion of the nation, religious nationalism, 
democratic faith, and Protestant civic piety (1974: 14-17). Richey and Jones felt that all of the various 
descriptions of civil religion offered by scholars would readily fall under these five categories. Yet even 
this schema proved problematic at times because so many descriptions of civil religion contained 
overlapping elements of the Richey and Jones' categories. For example, each of their categories 
usually drew upon civil events such as the 4th of July, Memorial Day, and presidential inaugurations, 
documents such as the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution, personages such as 
Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Lincoln, and common religious beliefs such as the belief in God 
and the chosen nation status of the United States. Moreover, it became increasingly apparent that not 
all civil religionists held to these common tenets. There seemed to be a less conservative version, one 
that drew upon a different set of religious values and portrayed the nation in a very different light. The 
traditional symbols seemed too often to grant the nation a unique identity in the world and legitimate its 
self-serving political, military, and economic interests. This form of civil religion raised questions about 
United States hegemony and challenged the nation to act on behalf of all humanity rather than solely its 
own interests. Even at presidential inaugurations, which Bellah believed were the primary ritual 
expression of American civil religion, 1 one could not help but notice the numerous dissidents protesting 
the diverse elements of the ceremony because of what they felt the events meant. What was needed 
was a more basic schema around which civil religion could continue to be analyzed and critiqued. 
 
It was Robert Wuthnow (1988a) who provided the much needed, more simplified schema for the study 
of American civil religion. It was simple enough -- two categories: conservative and liberal. Wuthnow, in 
offering this two-category approach, probably could have claimed as his own the remark made by 
Bellah in 1967 concerning Bellah's own pathbreaking assertion that civil religion in America was an 
autonomous religion with its own set of rituals, myths, and symbols: "Why something so obvious should 
have escaped serious analytical attention is in itself an interesting problem" (Bellah 1967: 21 n.1). But 
while Wuthnow's two-category schema was unabashedly plain, his presentation of it was convincing. 
He asserted: 
 
The civil religion to which we so blithely pay homage has... become deeply divided. Like the 
fractured communities found in our churches, our civil religion no longer unites us around 
common ideals. Instead of giving voice to a clear image of who we should be, it has become a 
confusion of tongues. It speaks from competing traditions and offers partial visions of America's 
future. Religious conservatives offer one version of our divine calling; religious liberals articulate 
one that is radically different (1988a: 395). 
 
Wuthnow's provocative article aptly described in general terms the basic frameworks of the 
conservative and liberal forms of American civil religion, but neither Wuthnow nor anyone since has 
sought to explore the specific tenets of each version. In particular, the moral aims of civil and criminal 
law, viewed from the perspectives of the two competing civil religions, has not been examined. This was 
the case even before Wuthnow offered his new schema; it was always assumed by most commentators 
that American civil religion included the belief that the nation's laws were imbued with biblical morality. 
But that there were two competing versions of what form this biblical morality should take did not 
become clear until the 1980s when the political activism of the Religious Right brought to light distinct 
differences in the way religious conservatives and religious liberals viewed the desired moral 
dimensions of law. The civil religion of both groups assured them that God was using the nation to carry 
out a special work in the world, but the radical differences in this vision, as it related to the relationship 
of law and morality, could not be explained without the benefit of something like Wuthnow's two-
category description of civil religion. It is now evident that the conservative and liberal versions of 
American civil religion include markedly different views, not only on the sources of law -- that is, the 
political theory or political theology that underlies the making of law -- but on the form the law should 
take relative to social issues such as abortion, homosexuality, pornography, and school prayer. 
 
The aim of this essay is to use Wuthnow's two-category model to describe the source and moral 
content of law as envisioned by the competing conservative and liberal versions of American civil 
religion. 
 
It is important to know something about the bases upon which conservative and liberal civil religionists 
legitimize law because it is the nation's commitment to law which in turn legitimizes the whole civil order 
for both groups. As is well-known, Max Weber devoted considerable attention to the problem of 
legitimacy and civil order. As Weber demonstrated, it is the citizens' belief in the legitimacy of a 
particular civil order that engenders confidence and loyalty and allows for peace and order. Absent this 
legitimacy, claimed Weber (1947), and an erosion of civil order occurs, leading to anarchy and/or 
revolution. 
 
It should be stated at the outset that the content of the rival versions of civil religion to be investigated is 
distinguishable from the political advocacy engaged in by American communities of faith on various 
social issues. A number of studies have demonstrated that civil religion in the United States is 
sufficiently advanced to be clearly differentiated from the political stances of the various religious groups 
represented nationwide (Coleman 1970, Parsons 1971, Cherry 1971, Christenson 1978). 
Consequently, specific elements of civil religious belief, such as the belief that all law should conform to 
God's law, or the belief that laws regulating abortion should be determined without recourse to religious 
beliefs, can be correspondingly differentiated from the advocacy of such positions by religious lobbies. 
The two are closely related, of course, and it may be that the civil religious beliefs of each version are 
merely the result of the metamorphosis and consequent appropriation of views of religious 
conservatives and religious liberals that were not so widely accepted before they were developed 
through the political advocacy process over the last fifteen years or so. Civil religious beliefs, however, 
would seem to be more fundamental, more pervasive, than mere advocacy positions; serving more as 
an overall worldview and perhaps even forming the theoretical basis for advocacy positions on various 
issues. In any case, it is the position of this essay that civil religious beliefs are distinguishable from 
general religious beliefs on the issue of the source and moral content of law. 
 
Before proceeding to a discussion of the nature, source, and content of law as envisioned by the 
conservative and liberal versions of American civil religion, it is necessary first to briefly describe the 
general tenets of these two versions of civil religion. 2 Such a description will provide a context for the 
discussion to follow concerning the theoretical and practical expectations of both versions regarding the 
formulation of law in America. 
 
 
Conservative Civil Religion 
  
The conservative version posits that America is a chosen nation. On this interpretation, our form of 
government enjoys lasting legitimacy because it was designed by founding fathers sensitive to God's 
leadership. While the framers omitted specific references to God in the Constitution, they made certain 
that the documents reflected biblical truths, such as the separation of powers which was intended as an 
auxiliary check on human sinfulness. As the late Francis Schaeffer, a popular evangelical author, 
asserted in A Christian Manifesto: "These men truly understood what they were doing. They knew they 
were building on the Supreme Being who was the Creator, the final reality... These were brilliant men 
who knew exactly what they were doing" (Schaefer 1981: 33). John Whitehead, head of the Rutherford 
Institute, says essentially the same thing: "The framers of our nation understood the need for Christian 
content in the system they were developing" (1982: 33). 
 
Closely related to the chosen nation theme is the notion that America is the instrument that God will use 
to usher in his millennial reign. In the frantic days just before the Continental Congress issued its 
Declaration of Independence, Connecticut preacher Ebenezer Baldwin, for example, expressed the 
widely held view that America might become "the principal seat of that glorious kingdom, which Christ 
shall erect upon earthen the latter days" (1776: 38). Herman Melville's nineteenth-century novel, White 
Jacket, described America as a "political Messiah" sent as an advance guard to "bear the ark of the 
liberties of the world" (quoted in Wuthnow 1988a: 396). In the twentieth century, two world wars and 
economic depressions dampened millennial expectations. Yet as America increasingly found itself in 
the forefront of world and economic affairs, much of the traditional zeal linking the nation with God's 
purposes continued to be voiced. 
 
In 1953, Congress, under encouragement from President Dwight Eisenhower, sought to solidify the 
nation's religious moorings by adding the words 'under God' to the pledge of allegiance. A year later, it 
decreed the nation's motto to be 'One Nation Under God'. 3 Norman Vincent Peale (1972) was 
sufficiently enamored with the new motto to adopt it as the title of his book in which he argued that 
America had for all of its history enjoyed a unique calling from God which continued to be expressed in 
the Christian commitment of its people. 
 
These themes have been important in recent political campaigns. In 1988, Pat Robertson mailed a 
letter to his constituents asserting that the Ten Commandments are the 'bedrock of America'. The letter 
further asserted that the essential truth upon which Robertson's candidacy for president was based was 
the conviction that "we must never forget -- and always remind those who will forget -- that we are ONE 
NATION UNDER GOD" (quoted in Wuthnow 1988a: 396). During his unsuccessful bid for the 
Republican nomination for president in 1992, Pat Buchanan called for the nation to 'return to God', 
lamenting that it is a "once Christian country that has been force-fed the poisons of paganism" (1988). 
His failed bid for the presidency in 1996 repeated the same message. 
 
Many conservative civil religionists go beyond calling for a generic 'Nation Under God' to calling for a 
specifically 'Christian nation'. Pat Robertson, for example, recently called upon Americans to reaffirm 
their country's "identity as a Christian nation" (Robertson 1992: np). Evangelist Jerry Falwell asserts 
that "God promoted America to a greatness no other nation has ever enjoyed because her heritage is 
one of a republic governed by laws predicated on the Bible" (1980: 16). Religious Right author David 
Barton, in his widely circulated book, The Myth of Separation, argues that the founding fathers intended 
"that this nation should be a Christian nation; not because all who lived in it were Christians, but 
because it was founded on and would be governed by Christian principles" (1990 quoted in Boston 
1993: 10). And Christian Reconstructionist Rousas J. Rushdoony unreservedly asserts, "The 
Constitution was designed to perpetuate a Christian order" (quoted in Barton 1990: 38). 
 
Conservative civil religion also sanctifies the American economic order. Typically, capitalism is praised 
as being fundamentally biblical. Economist George Gilder, who identifies himself as an evangelical 
Christian, once argued, 
 
Give and you'll be given unto is the fundamental practical principle of the Christian life, and when 
there's no private property you can't give it because you don't own it... Socialism is inherently 
hostile to Christianity and capitalism is simply the essential mode of human life that corresponds 
to religious truth (quoted in Clapp 1983: 27). 
 
Pat Robertson draws directly on Gilder's work to arrive at the conclusion that "free enterprise is the 
economic system most nearly meeting humanity's God-given need for freedom" (1982: 151). And for 
Jerry Falwell, American capitalism enjoys divine sanction: "God is in favor of freedom, property 
ownership, competition, diligence, work, and acquisition. All of this is taught in the Word of God in both 
the Old and New Testaments" (1984: 102). 
 
 
Liberal Civil Religion 
  
The liberal version of American civil religion is also linked to religious values, but in a different way. As 
Wuthnow notes, few spokespersons for the liberal version make explicit reference to the religious views 
of the founding fathers or suggest that the United States is God's chosen nation. Indeed, the idea of 
one nation under God is rejected because all nations are considered to have the equal concern and 
affection of God. 
 
America's role in world affairs is perceived much differently in the liberal version of civil religion. The 
nation has a responsible role to play in the world not because it is a chosen people but because it is 
uniquely blessed with vast resources to be shared. Rather than focusing on issues of personal morality, 
liberal civil religion is likely to stress global issues such as human rights, nuclear disarmament, world 
hunger, and peace. The importance attached to these issues is generally not legitimated with reference 
to any particular secular mandate, but simply on the belief that these are matters of life and death. 
Nevertheless, religious faith is frequently the motivation for involvement, differentiating civil religion from 
purely secular or humanist beliefs. The cry of the Old Testament prophets for peace and justice is the 
authoritative directive for liberal civil religion (Wuthnow 1988a: 397). 
 
A recent survey of Presbyterian clergy yielded results characteristic within liberal civil religion. When 
asked to rate various goals for the nation, respondents gave top priority to having America serve as an 
example of freedom and justice to all nations. Also ranked near the top were conserving the world's 
natural resources and wealth-sharing between rich and poor nations. Spreading American capitalism 
ranked near the bottom of the list. Eighty percent of the clergy polled thought national arrogance 
hindered Christian work in the world, while less than a third thought America was currently a blessing to 
humankind throughout the world (Hodge 1976). To many religious liberals, the United States is 
becoming a modern day Roman Empire, powerful, arrogant, and dominating the less developed world 
(Hertzke 1988: 107). 
 
Liberal civil religionists typically show a greater concern than their conservative counterparts in seeking 
peace and justice. Feeding the world's poor is a central focus, as illustrated by liberal support for such 
organizations as Bread for the World, Lutheran World Relief, Catholic World Relief, and World Vision. 
And a recent survey by the American National Election Study indicated that liberal religious lobbies are 
more than twice as supportive of defense spending reductions as conservative religious lobbies 
(Hertzke 1988: 136). 
 
The issue that perhaps most distinguishes the two versions of civil religion is church-state relations. On 
the one hand, the conservative version, in the classical and medieval tradition, is not reluctant to assign 
responsibility to the state for building the people's virtue through the promotion of religion. Thus public 
school prayer, parochiaid, and a general accommodation of religion -- especially Christianity -- are 
advocated. On the other hand, the liberal version, in Lockean fashion, seeks to cure the disruptive 
effects of religion in the public order by separating the two. The liberal version does not advocate the 
marginalization of religion, or even the separation of religion from society, but a policy of carrying out an 
institutional separation of religion and government in the belief that such a policy will enhance for both 
the pursuit and achievement of their essentially different goals. 
 
Obviously, the conservative and liberal versions of American civil religion are fundamentally at odds. 
The conservative version offers divine sanction to America, legitimates its form of government and 
economy, explains its privileged place in the world and to some extent justifies a uniquely American 
standard of luxury. The liberal version raises questions about what Will Herberg called 'the American 
Way of Life' (1974: 77), scrutinizes its political and economic policies in light of transcendent concerns, 
and challenges Americans to act on behalf of all humanity rather than their own interests alone. Each 
side sees itself as the champion of higher principles and the spokesman for what America is and should 
be about (Wuthnow 1988a). This is no less true for their respective descriptions of what are the 
foundational bases for law in America and how law accordingly should be shaped. 
 
 
Law and Morals in Civil Religion 
  
There are essentially four frameworks for understanding how the law of any particular political society 
should be formulated. These four frameworks have arisen chronologically in history, but none have 
totally eclipsed the others, and thus each remains with us today as a viable paradigm in the public 
lawmaking process. Because law is always concerned to some extent with morality, each of these four 
frameworks offer a different vision of how law should relate to morality. These four frameworks are 
revealed law, natural law, utilitarianism, and what might be called Kantian liberalism. The conservative 
and liberal versions of American civil religion both draw on more than one of these frameworks, but the 
dominant frameworks for each are different and result in very different visions of how law should govern 
Americans. 
 
It might be noted, too, that these four frameworks help to give meaning to the four types of civil 
legitimacy which Weber identified: 'legality,' 'traditionalism,' 'charisma,' and 'natural law'. 'Legality' is, in 
Weber's view, the category most prevalent among today's pluralistic societies, and is "the readiness to 
conform with rules... which are imposed by accepted procedure". 'Traditionalism' would look to 
longstanding practice and custom as the ground for civil legitimacy. 'Charisma' would emphasize 
revealed, transcendent truth, i.e., religion, and 'natural law' would look, of course, to natural law for civil 
legitimacy (1947: 130-32). Weber did not elaborate extensively on these four kinds of legitimacy, but the 
four frameworks of law to be discussed might serve as a kind of elaboration thereon. Revealed law 
might inform Weber's 'charisma' category, natural law easily conforms to his 'natural law' category, and 
utilitarianism and Kantian liberalism seem to give definition to his 'legality' and 'traditionalism' 
categories. In other words, revealed law, natural law, utilitarianism, and Kantian liberalism, as 
competing visions of how law should be framed in America, are the means by which the American 
people evaluate the legitimacy of their civil order. 
 
 
Revealed Law 
  
Operation Rescue leader Randell Terry recently remarked that one of the goals of his pro-life 
organization was a Christian America, built on nothing less than on God's law, specifically the Ten 
Commandments (Loretta 1994: 24). Rousas J. Rushdoony likewise calls for the full implementation of 
biblical law into American society, since the Bible is "intended to be valid for all time and in every civil 
order" (1973: 10). And in 1988, at the Republic State Convention of Arizona, Pat Robertson supporters 
and other Christian activists passed a resolution declaring America to be a 'Christian nation' based on 
the absolute laws of the Bible, not a democracy (Frame 1976: 200). While these positions are 
considered extreme by most Americans, it must be realized that in the scope of human history, revealed 
law has more often than not been the source of civil and criminal law codes. In ancient Babylon, for 
example, the Code of Hammurabi was believed to have been given by the king's personal god to 
enable the king to rule effectively. The Code was comprehensive in its coverage, regulating everything 
from homicide and perjury to the fees received by surgeons and masons. Likewise, in the days of 
Egypt's earliest recorded history, the gods were believed to deliver all of the empire's laws to the 
Egyptian kings (Pfeffer 1967: 34). 
 
In Western civilization, of course, it has been the Bible that has been most often looked to as the 
unassailable source for the formulation of human laws. Numerous societies, inspired by the covenantal 
relationship between God and Old Testament Israel, have sought to install theocratic frameworks that 
would make them God's most faithful servant and witness. Many have described the Holy Roman 
Empire in this way, but in truth, the Empire's legal framework always was laden with too much baggage 
from pre-Christian Greek, Roman, and Stoic natural law theory to be labeled a theocracy. The most 
notable attempts to build a civil order completely on the law of God have been Giralamo Savanarola's 
fifteenth-century Florence, John Calvin's sixteenth-century Geneva, and John Winthrop and John 
Cotton's seventeenth-century Massachusetts Bay Colony. Each of these experiments failed due in part 
to their autocratic tendencies, but this has not prevented some modern scholars, theonomists 
(Reconstructionists) in particular, from dreaming of a yet future Christian Utopia. For theonomist Gary 
North, the Massachusetts Bay Puritans come closest to successfully building a civil order based on 
God's law; their failures, such as the Salem Witchcraft trials in 1692, were mere minor violations of 
biblical principles that have received 'bad press' from 'secular humanist' historians (Rausch and 
Chismar 1983: 714). 
 
Not all conservative civil religionists, to be sure, would side with theonomists who believe that the Bible 
offers a blueprint for the rebuilding of modern society. While theonomists would hold out for such things 
as capital punishment for all capital crimes listed in the Old Testament, including adultery, homosexual 
acts, apostasy, blasphemy, and incorrigibility of children, more moderate conservative civil religionists 
would be satisfied with a selective integration of biblical 'principles' such as the reinstatement of 
'voluntary' public school prayer, the proscription of abortions, making illegal all homosexual acts 
(including marriage and adoptions by homosexual partners), and strict enforcement of pornography 
laws, especially those on selling illicit material to minors. 
 
Liberal civil religionists are less prone to claim that there is only one 'biblical' perspective on the various 
social issues that divide America. They are more inclined to permit divergent religious choices at the 
level of the individual than to impose one mandated view at the level of government. They fear the 
'Christian nation' rhetoric of the Religious Right, wishing for a nation instead that honors freedom, 
toleration, and religious and philosophical diversity. 
 
 
Natural Law 
  
Much of the history of political theory has been the attempt to structure human society according to the 
highest ruling principles of the universe. These ruling 'laws of nature,' which are accessible by reason to 
people of all races, classes, religions, and cultures, have usually been understood to exist by divine 
design, thus making it possible for humankind to live in harmony with God if only the natural laws can 
be ascertained and made the basis of positive law. While the roots of natural law theory extend to such 
classical theorists as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno, the Middle Ages were above all the centuries 
of natural law theory. In medieval Christendom, the laws of nature were thought to supplement 
Scripture as God's truth, and thus both served simultaneously as the foundation for canon law and civil 
law, the respective bodies of law of the two partners in the medieval world, church and state. Both 
bodies of law were constructed on the view that 'God is the source of all law'. Law is a part of the 
universal order and therefore unchangeable. Thus, humankind does not create law; it 'discovers' it. 4 
Law needs merely to be identified and catalogued. The Justinian Code, the basis for much of medieval 
Europe's civil law, was nothing more than a sixth-century collection, compilation, and organization of 
pre-existing 'discovered' laws. Its canon law counterpart, the Decretum, assembled by Gratian in the 
twelfth century, was merely a systematization of scriptural, conciliar, imperial, decretal, and patristic 
laws that had almost imperceptibly developed alongside the civil law throughout the Middle Ages. Like 
Justinian's Code, there was nothing 'new' in it; its benefit lay in its organized presentation of the law as 
'discovered' through God's instrument, the Church. 
 
In classical and medieval societies, the 'natural laws' virtually always served to subordinate the 
individual to the major communal institutions, church and state. Individuals had few 'rights', only 'duties' 
to submit oneself to the more important interests of God, the Church, an empire, a king, or a feudal lord. 
Divorce, for example, both under civil and canon law, was thought to violate natural law (and Scripture 
too) since it caused social disruption; laws preventing most divorces were therefore strictly enforced, 
less for the benefit of the individuals involved as for the preservation of the equilibrium of society. As  
medieval institutions began to break down in the High Middle Ages, however, giving way to newly 
developing nation-states, the individual began to win a new respect and autonomy, and by the 
fourteenth century, was widely considered to possess basic rights. The mediator in the shift from a 
state-defined to an individual-defined political identity of the human person was natural law (Wiltshire 
1992). By the seventeenth century, rights were possessed by individuals as a part of the God-created 
natural order. There might be disagreement as to the identity of humankind's natural rights, but the 
overall importance of these developments was clear: autonomous man was the constituent element in 
human society. 
 
The most clearly articulated list of rights, however brief, was John Locke's: life, liberty, and property. 
These became the foundation not only for the Declaration of Independence, but much of America's 
early political discourse. But natural law theory had two fundamental faults. First, it was a theory too 
vague to identify adequately the natural rights it produced. Natural law theory justified in the nineteenth 
century everything from slavery to the exclusion of women from the legal right to practice law to the 
right of churches to tax exemptions. Natural law could be called upon to justify any practice not covered 
explicitly by Scripture. Natural law's second fault was its linkage to the transcendent. Many utilitarian 
thinkers considered the religious foundations of natural law to be a major source of humankinds' 
inability to formulate laws that were pragmataic and effective. As American moral and jurisprudential 
theory sought to remove once and for all the unity of ethics and politics under the banner of 
utilitarianism, the assumptions of liberal individualism which natural law theory embodied remained the 
premise of much political discourse. 
 
U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Clarence Thomas discovered in his 1991 Senate confirmation 
hearings just how little regard many Americans have for natural law. When he suggested that judges 
might be free to appeal to natural law to decide cases, a torrent of disapproval flowed from the pens of 
legal commentators and editorial writers. The usual objection was that natural law might have been 
relied upon in past days when the fabric of precedent and statute was more loosely woven and judges 
had to make some general moral appeal to fill in gaps in the law, but that today, such makeshift 
decisions should almost never be required (Lovin 1991: 869). 
 
Yet, while many would warn of the threats to civil liberty and constitutional integrity that are posed by 
the doctrine of natural law, the simple fact is that most Americans have difficulty rejecting it completely. 
Justice Thomas himself admitted that he used it at his Senate hearings mostly as a piece of political 
rhetoric designed to appeal to political conservatives. And, too, anyone who believes in the Bible as 
God's revelation would be inclined to believe in natural law in one form or another as a means of 
explaining humankind's awareness of universal truths not specifically set forth in Scripture. One might 
argue that Catholics, whose faith is immersed in a rich tradition of natural law, maintain a firm foothold 
in its doctrines, whereas Protestants, who are prone to look to Scripture alone for faith and practice, do 
not. But this would not be accurate because many Protestants, especially fundamentalists, are 
sufficiently well-versed to know that the natural law dimensions of the Declaration of Independence are 
essential to their aim of making America a Christian nation. 
 
Although natural law may be only a very loose set of ideals for most Americans in the late twentieth 
century, it is so much a part of the history and fabric of American life that it is embraced to one degree 
or another by both the conservative and liberal wings of American civil religion. This should come as no 
surprise, since natural law is a traditional religious doctrine and both the conservative and liberal 
versions of American civil religion are in fact profoundly 'religious' in traditional ways. Natural law is, 
however, embraced in different ways by the two competing versions of American civil religion. 
Conservative civil religion focuses on the belief that natural law is synonymous with religion, and cites 
natural law to support political positions in opposition to abortion, homosexuality, right-to-die, school 
prayer, and the like. As already mentioned, it assumes that the natural law framework of Jefferson's 
Declaration, which allowed for four references to the deity, is lasting proof of the Christian vision that the 
founders had for the nation. There is little awareness that the same natural law framework shaped 
Lockean liberalism's commitment to individual rights, including religious freedom and its concomitant 
notion of a secular state. Baptist fundamentalist pastor W.A. Criswell expressed such a contradiction by 
declaring: "there is no such thing as the separation of church and state. It is merely a figment of the 
imagination of some infidel" (quoted in Dunn 1994: 3). 
 
For liberal civil religionists, the appeal to natural law remains more important to international issues, 
such as the prosecution of war crimes, the protection of human rights, and the pursuit of world peace. In 
domestic terms, the appeal to natural law is less frequent, since modern statutory and judicial law are 
thought to provide a detailed framework in which most questions can be decided without recourse to 
larger and more ambiguous ideas about what persons want and require. For example, since large 
claims about women's roles, sexuality, human reproduction, and racial superiority have often been the 
basis for oppression and discrimination, liberal civil religionists are grateful for the expansion of positive 
law that makes recourse to natural law infrequent and unnecessary. Even though the law regarding 
abortion, sexuality, or termination of life-support issues is less settled, liberal civil religionists would tend 
to argue that law in these areas should develop through consensus, not because some vague notion of 
natural law would support a particular outcome (Lovin 1991: 870). 
 
 
Utilitarianism 
  
It is not really surprising that utilitarianism's day in America has largely come and gone. It made no 
allowance for religion and therefore had no wide appeal to the American populous. For the same 
reason it has never been a major tenet of American civil religion. While it remains for some a viable 
political theory and moral philosophy, it is discussed here only to show how its assault upon natural law 
led to the enshrinement of a political philosophy in late twentieth-century America of what in many ways 
was a compromise between the thoroughly religious outlook of natural law and the equally thoroughly 
nonreligious outlook of utilitarianism. We shall later refer to this compromise as Kantian liberalism. 
 
The nineteenth century was very much the age of liberalism, but the underlying philosophical 
assumptions of the doctrine -- especially its foundation in natural law -- were radically altered in the 
early part of the century by thinkers who came to be known as utilitarians. 5 The thinker most 
responsible for first changing the natural law foundations of liberalism was David Hume (1711-1776). 
Hume's moral philosophy was based on a "new" insight into the psychology of human behavior. That 
which people claim is morally good or bad, said Hume, is really nothing more than sentiment. 
Sentiment, in turn, is simply a reflection of what people find agreeable or disagreeable. That which they 
find agreeable is good, disagreeable, bad. In short, people's moral rules are utilities -- morality is 
determined by the amount of pleasure or pain an experience brings. 
 
Hume's utilitarianism was directed against the whole natural law tradition of ethical discourse. In place 
of that tradition, Hume wanted to create a strictly naturalistic ethics that could be scientifically validated, 
for he believed that there is simply no way to prove scientifically the existence of natural law or any 
other ethical standard. Natural law, thought Hume, is simply a moral sentiment, a utility, that people 
have historically but mistakenly taken to be an objective moral standard. Likewise, Hume believed, 
natural rights such as life, liberty, and property, which spring from natural law theory, are nothing more 
than moral sentiment. Rights and liberties have no moral foundation; they exist as utilities, plain and 
simple. 
 
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) found Hume's ideas to his liking, especially the removal of 
transcendence from moral philosophy. Bentham sought to extend utilitarian ideas into political theory 
and law. Taking Hume's pleasure/pain principle, he theorized that government ought to maximize 
pleasure and minimize pain for the greatest number possible. In Bentham's famous formulation, the 
principle applied at the legislative level must be 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number'. Here at 
last, thought Bentham, was a political theory built on genuine science with no relation to Scripture or 
some larger ethical order. 
 
Bentham's utilitarian science was remarkably popular in late nineteenth-century America. It became a 
conventional rule designed to control behavior by creating pleasure or, in the case of criminal law, by 
inflicting pain. It has lost its appeal in the twentieth century, however, not only because its application 
has not always produced good results, but more particularly because it was increasingly criticized as a 
product of the Darwinian revolution against time-honored religious truths. 
 
The late twentieth-century has not seen fit to return, however, at least completely, to natural law theory. 
What has developed has been a rights-based ethic over the utilitarian one, due in large part to the 
powerful influence of John Rawls's A Theory of Justice, published in 1971. Rawls's theory lays 
emphasis on the protection of basic human rights, not those that are theoretically God-given as under 
natural law, but those that are so fundamental that the members of any start-up society would 
automatically choose them. Rawls' ideas are an application of Kantian liberalism, which itself had 
seemed to have been forging its way into the American system long before Rawls appeared on the 
scene, and is now so well entrenched (though hardly by the name 'Kantian liberalism') that it must be 
said to have ties to American civil religion. 
 
 
Kantian Liberalism 
  
Utilitarianism's greatest weakness was that it failed to provide adequate protections for individual rights. 
While serious questions are being asked whether America has allowed its liberal principles to extend 
too far in the protection of individual rights, very few are calling for a wholesale return to utilitarian 
principles as a solution to this problem. The Kantian critique of utilitarianism remains valid two hundred 
years later. Kant (1785) argued that strictly empirical principles, such as utility, not only leave rights 
vulnerable, but fail to recognize the inherent dignity of persons. The utilitarian calculus, he thought, 
treats persons as the means to the happiness of others, not as ends in themselves, worthy of respect. 
 
Today's liberals are well known for defending what they oppose -- pornography, for example. They state 
that the state should not impose a preferred (religious or otherwise) view of life, but should leave its 
citizens as free as possible to choose their own values and lifestyles, consistent with a similar liberty for 
others. This commitment to freedom of choice requires liberals constantly to distinguish between 
allowing a practice and endorsing it. It is one thing to allow pornography they argue, something else to 
affirm it. Whether or not aware that they are acting in the Kantian tradition, their goal is to respect the 
dignity of the other person, to respect his rights without necessarily affirming his choices. 6 
 
Conservatives sometimes balk at this approach to life, arguing that it is just compromise. They charge 
that those who allow pornography favor pornography, those who allow abortion favor abortion, that 
opponents of school prayer oppose prayer. And in a pattern of argument familiar in our politics, liberals 
reply by invoking higher principles; freedom is all about respecting differences, they say. But does the 
liberal response extend beyond moral relativism? Is there a moral basis to the liberal resolve not to 
favor any particular ends, or to impose on American's citizens a preferred way of life? Is this approach  
an improvement on utilitarianism, which denies all moral foundations? Kantians would reply, yes, on all 
counts. 
 
Modern-day Kantians argue that such an ethic is superior to utilitarianism not only because it takes 
rights seriously, but because it is an ethic that, unlike utilitarianism, can be morally justified. They draw 
a distinction between the 'right' and the 'good' -- between a framework of basic rights and liberties, and 
the conceptions of the good that persons may choose to pursue within that framework. It is one thing for 
the state to support a fair framework, they argue, something else to affirm some particular ends. For 
example, it is one thing to defend freedom of religion so that people may make their own decisions 
about ultimate things, but quite another thing to support it on grounds that a religious life is preferable to 
a nonreligious one. Neutrality is at the center of the Kantian perspective. In fact, the achievement of a 
framework neutral among ends is itself its moral justification. The value of this moral justification 
consists precisely in the neutral framework's refusal to affirm a preferred way of life or a conception of 
the good. It is a framework within which individuals and groups can choose their own values and ends, 
consistent with a similar liberty for others. 
 
Few would argue that the Kantian rights-based ethic just described is the dominant political philosophy 
now operating in America. It is indeed a compromise between natural law theory and utilitarianism; it 
yields to natural law by allowing for religious perspectives in the lives of American citizens, but yields 
also to utilitarianism by not requiring religious perspectives. It is an ethic that has always had a place in 
American public philosophy, but is now more firmly in place than ever before. 
 
The Kantian ethic enjoys popularity with the liberal version of American civil religion. It places a high 
priority on fundamental rights without requiring agreement as to what those rights are. It favors a 
scheme of civil liberties, including rights to welfare, education, and health care, and allows choice on 
such controversial issues as abortion, sexuality, and school prayer. It makes room for persons who hold 
any range of positions on all kinds of issues, thereby acknowledging the racial, ethnic, and religious 
pluralism that is the great source of division in America. 
 
The Kantian liberal ethic's greatest weakness, conservatives would argue, is its neutral stance, its 
absence of conviction on any of the moral issues that really matter like abortion, prayer, homosexuality, 
pornography, and that which guides one to the correct views on all these issues, the Judeo-Christian 
ethic. And this critique is affirmed, conservatives would say, by the position of church-state separation 
that is mandated by the Kantian ethic. Perhaps Jerry Falwell's sentiments on church-state separation 
express the feelings of many religious conservatives: "The idea that religion and politics don't mix was 
invented by the Devil to keep Christians from running their own country" (Falwell 1987:100). Indeed, 
under the Kantian ethic, no religious viewpoint is given preferential treatment, none is supported, and all 
are granted the right to the free exercise of religion. 
 
Kantian rights-based liberalism, now an integral part of the American political way of life, has played a 
significant role in recent decades in crystallizing the differences between the two forms of American civil 
religion. Kantian liberalism refuses to affirm Christianity or even religion in general as the ethic that 
should guide law and legislation in America. It generates little support among conservative civil 
religionists for whom the destiny of the nation is tied to Christianity's remaining the country's guiding 
moral force. The Kantian ethic, however, finds favor with liberal civil religionists because it assigns to 
the state a limited role in directing the moral forces that guide the nation. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
  
Many might be inclined to argue that the content of the two forms of civil religion embraced by American 
citizens does not extend as far as what has been presented in this paper. That may be true if we are  
speaking of the vocabulary or language with which the content of a particular form of civil religion is 
defined in popular terms. Certainly less formal language would be employed by the average American 
civil religionist -- he is unlikely to articulate his views, for example, in terms of the distinction between 
utilitarianism and Kantian liberalism -- but that does not alter the reality or the more sophisticated 
recognition of that reality within the academic community and its immediate reaches. The tenets of each 
form of civil religion should not be denied on the theory that those who are civil religious cannot 
articulate their beliefs in a particular way. 
 
The two versions of American civil religion both have a vision of what America is all about and where it 
should be heading. These two visions are fundamentally at odds. Neither can claim a consensus about 
the nation's founding ideology, the core values that define America, and what should be preserved or 
changed in America. The conservative version claims for America a divinely bestowed uniqueness 
unlike that enjoyed by any other nation in the world, and seeks to preserve the values it believes 
warranted its blessing in the first place. The liberal version appreciates the nation's blessings and 
privileged place in the world, rejoices in the diversity of people enjoying its benefits, and seeks to 
extend its enjoyments to the rest of the world.. 
 
The two forms of civil religion also differ, specifically, on the political theory that should guide the nation 
and the kind of law that should in turn be generated. The conservative version looks to revelation and 
natural law to produce a set of laws that reflect biblical morality. The liberal version combines these two 
with political theories derived from utilitarianism and Kantian liberalism to produce laws that treat all 
Americans on equal terms and allow for maximum choice among the citizenry. 
 
At one level, the coexistence of two versions of civil religion is probably unhealthy for American society. 
Because both sides are prone to criticize each other, Americans as a whole are often left doubting the 
credibility of either. This minimizes civil religions' highest goal and benefit -- unity among the nation's 
citizens. The result is increased polarization among the citizenry in a nation that could use some union 
and solidarity. Moreover, the consequent lack of credibility for two civil religions that both uphold 
religious values further opens the gates for secular ideologies to flourish. If the conservative version of 
American civil religion is largely composed of Christian fundamentalists and evangelicals, and the 
liberal version of religious moderates -- which seems accurate enough -- then perhaps both versions 
need to be less concerned with each other and more concerned about the growth of naturalist 
ideologies which espouse only excessive materialism, radical individualism, and the further 
marginalization of religion. 
 
At another level, however, the presence of two competing versions of civil religion might be healthy for 
American society. Weber did not speak systematically to the matter of combinations of his four types of 
civil legitimacy coexisting simultaneously, but it seems that they are at once all present in the American 
situation. Likewise, the four frameworks for law previously discussed, as the substantive elements of 
Weber's categories, are certainly at once all present in today's America. While some might argue that 
this situation augurs for dissensus, even chaos, I would suggest that it preserves the political dynamism 
which is the lifeblood of the American system and encourages cooperation as a much-needed and 
essential ingredient of life in a pluralistic society. 
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Footnotes 
 
1 A recent work by John E. Semonche (1998) challenges Bellah's thesis that presidents are the high 
priests of American civil religion, pointing instead to members of the Supreme Court. 
 
2 Much of the discussion to follow tracks Professor Wuthnow's description in 'Divided We Fall'. 
Wuthnow's description is expanded in his book The Restructuring of American Religion (1988: 241-67). 
 
3 Susan-Mary Grant (1997: 90) observes that 'In God We Trust' was first proposed, but rejected, by 
Congress as the national motto in 1861 in the face of the impending Civil War. 
 
4 For a brief, but insightful account of the merit of medieval law being measured by its age, see Fritz 
Kern 1970: 235. 
 
5 For an excellent treatment, from which much of the following discussion has been drawn, see Nelson 
1982 ch. 11, 'Classical Liberalism'. 
 
6 For my discussion in this regard I am much indebted to Professor Michael Sandel and his excellent 
introduction to Liberalism and Its Critics (1984). 
